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Why Real Leisure Really Matters:
Incentive Effects on Real Effort in the Laboratory.

Abstract: On-the-job leisure is a pervasive feature of the modern workplace. We
studied its impact on work performance in a laboratory experiment by either
allowing or restricting Internet access. We used a 22 experimental design in
which subjects completing real-effort work tasks could earn cash according to
either individual- or team-production incentive schemes. Under team pay,
production levels were significantly lower when Internet browsing was available
than when it was not. Under individual pay, however, no differences in
production levels were observed between the treatment in which Internet was
available and the treatment in which it was not. In line with standard incentive
theory, individual pay outperformed team pay across all periods of the experiment
when Internet browsing was available. This was not the case, however, when
Internet browsing was unavailable. These results demonstrate that the integration
of on-the-job leisure activities into an experimental labor design is crucial for
uncovering incentive effects.

KEYWORDS: Incentive, Free riding, Internet access, Experimental method
JEL CODES: C92, D23, M52
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1. INTRODUCTION
Studying Incentives in the Lab
Incentive theory plays a crucial role in the study of economic phenomena and is a natural
candidate for extensive experimental investigation. As a result, the field of experimental labor
economics (Charness and Kuhn, 2011) has emerged to test many of the predictions that have
been generated by incentive and contract theories (Laffont and Martimort, 2002; Bolton and
Dewatripont, 2005). These experimental protocols have, however, left aside the study of on-thejob leisure activities which unarguably constitute an important part of the work environment
(Malachowski, 2005). In this paper, we propose to fill this gap by integrating on-the-job leisure
into the evaluation of incentive effects in the laboratory.
From a methodological standpoint, the inclusion of on-the-job leisure activities in
laboratory experiments may help attenuate active participation, an issue raised by Lei, Noussair
and Plott (2001) in the context of experimental asset markets. Specific details of an experiment
protocol, such as availability of alternatives to focal “work”, might encourage or fail to
encourage subjects to actively perform effortful work. For example, subjects may engage
actively in a focal work task because of expectations, rewards, and lack of desirable alternatives.
When desirable alternatives are present, active participation in effortful work may be traded off
to some degree, revealing subtle incentive effects such as from small shifts in wage or
manipulations of incentive schemes. We suspect that active participation has previously been an
issue because, despite predictions that individual incentives should outperform team incentives
(Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Holmström, 1982), several published studies, and perhaps even
more unpublished studies, have failed to observe such differences (van Dijk, Sonnemans and van
Winden, 2001; Dohmen and Falk, 2011).
The Real-Leisure Alternative
We investigated the effects of providing a leisure alternative on subjects’ performance in a
real-effort work task by either allowing or restricting Internet access during the experiment. We
considered a real-effort mental arithmetic (summation) task in the spirit of previous laboratory
experiments (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; Bartling, Fehr, Maréchal and Schunk, 2009;
Eriksson, Poulsen and Villeval, 2009; Dohmen and Falk, 2011).1 We manipulated the incentive
1

A large number of studies have incorporated other types of real-effort tasks such as solving mazes (Gneezy,
Niederle and Rustichini, 2003), puzzles (Rutström and Williams, 2000), anagrams (Charness and Villeval, 2009),
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setting by rewarding work performance according to either an individual pay or team pay
scheme.
We used Internet browsing to represent on-the-job “real-leisure”2 because it is a growing
and popular on-the-job leisure activity and a representative feature of the workplace. The
availability of on-the-job Internet access has increased, due in part to most Americans now
owning a smartphone capable of Internet browsing and less subject to employee usage
restrictions (Smith, 2013). According to a 2005 study by American Online and Salary.com,
employees spent about 26% of their time on activities unrelated to their work (Malachowski,
2005). Almost half of this time was spent browsing the Internet. Also, the Internet is frequently
browsed by and widely available to university students (our subject pool), providing them with a
wide range of activities (Jones et al., 2009).
Previous studies have proposed alternative experimental designs to moderate active
participation in experiments. For example, Mohnen, Pokorny and Sliwka (2008) gave subjects
the option to take a 25-second time-out during which they were not able to work on the counting
task and for which they were paid 0.10€. While subjects frequently engage in pleasurable activity
during their breaks (e.g. socializing, browsing the Internet), the time-out setting investigated by
Mohnen and colleagues rewarded subjects for taking breaks characterized by inactivity. Contrary
to these designs with “abstract” leisure, in our environment we expect heterogeneity in derived
utility from leisure (here proxied by internet access). However, Internet browsing, by offering an
unprecedented range of leisure options, reduces the heterogeneity in the value of leisure
compared to other “real leisure” alternatives such as giving subjects access to selected
magazines. Also, the advantage of this implementation is that subjects can choose to engage in
leisure activity – a more representative feature of the real workplace.
In line with the real-effort literature we argue that a real-leisure option cannot be
instantiated simply as a decision for a monetary alternative. For example, workers who may be
reluctant to steal money from an employer or firm may still be willing to spend time browsing
optimization problems (Dickinson and Villeval, 2008; Montmarquette et al., 2004; van Dijk, Sonnemans and van
Winden, 2001), typing (Dickinson, 1999) or mailing tasks (Carpenter, Matthews and Schirm, 2010; Falk and Ichino,
2006).
2
Evidence from neuroscience supports an association between rewarding Internet activities and dopamine (Koepp et
al., 1998; Tamir & Mitchell, 2012), supporting the notion that Internet browsing is a “real”, not abstract, form of
leisure. Furthermore, dopamine levels across different parts of the brain have been shown to influence one’s work
ethic (Treadway et al., 2012), suggesting the mechanism by which real-leisure alternatives may interfere with realeffort.

4

the Internet while paid for being “on-the-job”. They may justify Internet browsing as part of their
legitimate search for valuable work information or they may consider paid work to include some
real-leisure “breaks”. Internet browsing on the job has been shown to damage employees’
productivity (Young, 2005; 2006) and incurred U.S. corporations at least $85 billion in yearly
costs (Alder, Noel and Ambrose, 2006). Consideration of leisure-related issues in the
experimental economics literature dates back to Dickinson’s (1999) labor supply study in which
subjects working on a typing task were provided an option to leave the laboratory whenever they
had achieved a certain output level. Quitting options have since been introduced into subsequent
studies on minimum wages and workfare (e.g. Falk and Huffman, 2007, Abeler et al., 2011).
Given the lack of control over subjects’ activities and desired alternatives outside the laboratory,
heterogeneity in quitting behaviors has been difficult to interpret. Quitting options are also not
representative of the typical workplace regime as salaried employees in most organizations are
required to comply with a minimum number of completed work hours per pay period.
Unlike previous experiments, our design embeds on-the-job leisure alternatives into the
work environment, allowing the measurement of each subject’s time allocation to leisure or work
activities. While two related experimental studies (Eriksson, Poulsen and Villeval, 2009;
Charness, Masclet and Villeval, 2010) have introduced on-the-job leisure alternatives by giving
subjects access to magazines (for browsing or reading), they have not reported effects of on-thejob leisure activity on subjects’ performance.3
To our knowledge, ours is the first experimental work to have measured subjects’ time
allocation to real-effort work tasks or on-the-job leisure and to have analyzed the effects of
access to leisure on subjects’ performance. We studied the effect of on-the-job leisure in two of
the most popular incentive schemes: individual pay and team pay (e.g. Prendergast, 1999;
Lazear, 2000; Hamilton, Nickerson and Owan, 2003). We conducted a 22 design in which we
varied the availability of Internet access (available or not) and the type of pay (rewarded
according to individual performance or team performance). For each of the four treatments,
subjects were matched in groups of seven to ten people and completed the experiments in five
periods of 20 minutes.
3

Since Deci (1971), experiments measuring motivation have also provided subjects access to magazines during
experiments as a real leisure alternative to a focal task (though they do not measure and report time allocated to
browsing magazines). The provision of magazines while measuring “free choice intrinsic motivation” is still
reported in more recent psychology and decision science publications (e.g. Zapata-Phelan, Colquitt, Scott, &
Livingston, 2009).
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Subjects used the Internet option when available. They dedicated 28.5% of their time to
browsing the Internet under team pay while only dedicating 11.9% of their time to Internet
browsing under individual pay. Consequently, the impact of Internet browsing on subjects’
performance was different across payment schemes. The availability of Internet browsing
reduced production significantly under team pay while it did not reduce production under
individual pay. In addition, we observed that incentive effects (measured as the difference in
production between the individual pay and the team pay treatments) were more pervasive when
Internet browsing was available. In the presence of Internet browsing, incentive effects were
significant across all periods of the experiment while no incentive effects were found in the first
two periods of the experiment when Internet browsing was not included in the design. This
suggests that incentive effects may be sensitive to real-leisure alternatives such as Internet
browsing and that previous real-effort experiments lacking this feature may have failed to
uncover incentive effects which are reasonable to expect in the workplace.
2. EXPERIMENTAL ENVIRONMENT
We developed a framework in which subjects could undertake a real-effort task, while
being able to browse the Internet.4
The Work Task
Adapted from previous research using mental arithmetic (summation) tasks (e.g., Eriksson,
Poulsen and Villeval, 2009), the work task required real-effort in the form of mental
concentration (because it makes strong demands on working memory (see Chase and Ericsson,
1982)). By using a long, repetitive and effortful task we ensured that individual performance was
mostly driven by real (mental) effort considerations. The duration of our task, 5 periods of 20
minutes each, as well as its intricacy were considerably greater than in previous real-effort
experiments that have reported the use of summation tasks (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007;
Bartling, Fehr, Maréchal and Schunk, 2009; Eriksson, Poulsen and Villeval, 2009; Dohmen and
Falk, 2011). The task required subjects to sum up tables of 36 numbers without using a pen,
scratch paper, or calculator (see Figure 1). Each table had six rows and six columns of randomlygenerated numbers from zero to ten. Before providing the grand total in the bottom-right cell,
subjects had to provide separate subtotals for each of the 12 rows and columns. Calculating these
4

A video presentation of the software is available at: https://sites.google.com/site/realleisureincentives/home/video.
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subtotals did not directly generate earnings but could help subjects compute the grand total. A
correct grand total answer increased production by 40 cents while 20 cents were subtracted if the
answer was incorrect.5 After completing each table, subjects learned whether their answer was
correct and what their accumulated production value was. At the end of each period, subjects
learned the total amount of money generated on the work task by all subjects of their group.
Figure 1. — WORK TASK.

At any point during the experiment, all subjects in the treatments with Internet availability
could switch from the work task to Internet browsing, and vice versa. Subjects could spend as
much or as little time as they wanted on the various activities, each of which was undertaken on
a separate screen. To switch activities, subjects simply chose the corresponding option from a
drop-down menu at the bottom-right of their screens.
Internet Browsing
In the “Internet” treatments where the leisure alternative was available, if subjects chose to
browse the Internet, the work task window was replaced by an Internet window (embedded in the
software; see Figure 2). Within the bounds of university policy, subjects could use the Internet
however they liked, including email, instant messaging, and social networking. Their
confidentiality was assured and maintained, but the software tracked the exact amount of time
spent on each activity. Subjects did not receive feedback regarding others’ use of the Internet.
Although subjects could not complete the work task while browsing the Internet, switching
between tasks was quick and easy. Subjects were told in the instructions that using any internetbased devices, or calculators, to sum up numbers was not allowed.

5

So that subjects did not lose money for their participation, penalties only applied when individuals had already
produced a positive amount.
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Figure 2. — EMBEDDED INTERNET SCREEN.

Click Pay
In addition to the activities described above, subjects could click on a yellow box that
appeared at the bottom of their screen every 25 seconds, independent of whether the subject was
currently working on the task or browsing the Internet. Each time subjects clicked on the yellow
box they earned 5 cents. The earnings on this task were intended to represent a fixed wage of $12
which was paid in addition to the performance pay.
3. TREATMENTS, HYPOTHESES AND PROCEDURES
Treatments
We conducted four treatments as part of a 22 design in which we varied the availability of
the Internet (“Internet” or “No Internet”) and the type of performance-based incentive scheme
(“individual pay” or “team pay”). In the individual pay treatments, subjects were rewarded on the
work task according to their individual production. Under team pay, the total production of the
group was equally distributed among subjects so that each of them received 10% of the total
production of the 10 group members in each session.
Hypotheses
We derive our hypotheses from the moral-hazard in teams model introduced by Holmström
(1982). We consider N workers producing a total output
worker’s effort

where

which depends on each

. Each worker i decides to allocate her time, normalized to

one, to the following activities: work effort (

) or leisure (

utility function of worker i can be expressed as follows:

8

), so that

. The

where

stands for the cost of effort function with

utility of leisure with

and

, and

assigned to worker i. Under team pay,

and

,

stands for the

stands for the share of group production

while under individual pay workers are rewarded

according to their actual contribution to the group outcome. If we assume that
in workers’ effort and in particular if we assume that

is separable
, where A is

under individual incentives.6 We derive our main

the marginal product of effort, then

predictions by using the following specification of the workers’ utility function:7

where

and

. We obtain the following equilibrium values for work effort for

individual pay with (without) Internet:
(without) Internet:

(

) and for team pay with

).8 We compare work effort, leisure (time spent

(

browsing the Internet), and production across treatments and summarize our findings in the
following hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1 (Internet Availability Effects across Incentive Schemes)
Under individual [team] pay, subjects are expected to produce less with the real-leisure
option to browse the Internet than without it, provided

[

]. Otherwise,

for a given incentive scheme no difference in subjects’ production is expected between the
available and unavailable Internet treatments.
Therefore, if the cost of effort

and the utility of leisure

compared with the marginal productivity of effort

are sufficiently high

, Internet availability will reduce subjects’

production. This condition is more likely to be satisfied under team pay since

.

Additionally, the decrease in production due to Internet browsing should be more pervasive
where the utility of leisure

is greater.

6

Kandel and Lazear (1992) assume nonseparability in effort so as to justify the existence of partnerships and
eliminate the possibility of self-employment. In this paper, we do not aim at justifying the existence of partnerships
and simply assume separability of the utility function in effort so as to match our experimental design more closely.
7
For simplicity of exposition, we express the utility of leisure (Internet browsing) as the opportunity cost of not
browsing the Internet (
).
8
We derive these calculations in Appendix A.
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Hypothesis 2 (Incentive Scheme Effects and Internet Availability)
When Internet is [not] available , subjects are expected to produce less with team pay than
with individual pay, provided

[

]. Otherwise, no difference in subjects’

production is expected between incentive schemes.
Therefore, if the cost of effort and the utility of leisure are sufficiently high compared with
the marginal productivity of effort, production should be higher under individual pay than under
team pay. This condition is more likely to be satisfied when Internet is available since

. In

addition, we show in Appendix A that in the case in which Internet is available the difference in
production between individual pay and team pay increases in the utility of leisure and in the cost
of effort if

and

, and decreases in both variables if

.

Procedures
Two-hundred forty three individuals were recruited from a subject pool at a major U.S.
university to participate in the current study in exchange for money. The experiments took place
between December 2010 and May 2011 with treatments randomly assigned across 26 experiment
sessions (see Table 1).9
Table 1. — SUMMARY OF TREATMENTS.
Real-Leisure Availability
No Internet
Internet
Individual Pay
7 (57)
7 (66)
Incentive Schemes
Team Pay
6 (60)
6 (60)
Note: Cells report number of sessions (subjects)10

Subjects were told that the set of computerized instructions were identical for all the
subjects. Subjects had 20 minutes to read the instructions (see Appendix C), with a timer
displayed on a large screen at the front of the lab. 11 Experimental sessions lasted on average two
hours and thirty minutes.
At the end of the experiment, subjects were paid their earnings in cash, rounded up to the
nearest quarter. Individual earnings at the end of the experiment were computed as the sum of

9

Technical issues prevented the analysis of one of the sessions in the treatment with individual pay and no Internet.
All sessions involved groups of ten subjects except two sessions with 8 subjects in the treatment with individual
pay and Internet, and two sessions with 8 subjects and three sessions with 7 subjects in the treatment with individual
pay and no Internet.
11
None of the subject asked questions or requested extra time.
10

10

the earnings in the five periods. Subjects earned on average $26.94 (including the $7 show-up
fee).
4. RESULTS
Aggregate measures
We define production as the monetary amount generated by a subject’s answers on the
work task divided by the reward for each correct answer (40¢). Production can thus be
interpreted as the total number of correct tables completed by a given subject discounted by the
(weighted) number of incorrect answers. In Table 2, we report descriptive statistics of subjects’
total production from the work task in the five periods of the experiment, across treatments.

Treatment
Internet
Availability
No Internet
Individual Pay
Internet
No Internet
Team Pay
Internet

Table 2. — TOTAL PRODUCTION.
Two-sided p-values
Standard
Average Median
Clustered t-test
deviation
(Clustered Rank Sum test)

Incentive
Scheme

24.60
22.16
19.53
15.64

23.50
22.00
21.25
15.25

12.19
11.86
9.19
10.55

p = .272
(p = .118)
p = .035
(p = .014)

Under team pay, subjects’ total production was significantly lower in the treatment in
which Internet was available than in the treatment in which it was not, whether we used
parametric or non-parametric clustered tests. Clustered tests were used to control for the fact that
individual production in a given session may have been affected by group production. 12 These
findings are in line with Hypothesis 1 according to which the availability of Internet reduces
production under team pay as long as

. Under individual pay, even though average

(median) production was 11.0% (6.8%) lower when Internet was available than when it was not,
the difference was not statistically significant. This is consistent with our model when
, in which case the level of effort is maximal whether Internet is available or not. The fact that
12

This correction was especially relevant for the treatments with team pay in which case the contributions of other
group members, displayed on a subject’s screen at the end of each period, may have affected an individual’s
motivation to work. This may have led subjects to free ride whenever they observed an increase in group production
as is the case in standard public good games (see Ledyard (1995) for a survey, and Corgnet et al. (2011) for further
analyses).
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Internet effects were significant under team pay while they were not significant under individual
pay relates to the fact that Internet usage was more pronounced under team pay (28.5% of
subjects’ available time) than under individual pay (11.9%) (Clustered t-test and rank-sum tests:
p < .001 and p = .008, respectively).
Intensive Internet users produced significantly less than other subjects, regardless of the
treatment, stressing the disruptive effect of using the Internet. In particular, the probability of
completing a given table correctly was negatively affected by switching between the work task
and the Internet and by time spent browsing (see Appendix D for the statistical analysis). Also,
production levels were negatively correlated with the time subjects spent on the Internet. The
correlation coefficients were equal to -0.727 (p < 0.001) and -0.582 (p < 0.001) under pay and
individual pay, respectively. 13
We summarize our findings as follows.
RESULT 1. (Internet effects)
Under team pay, subjects produced significantly less in the treatment in which Internet was
available than in the treatment in which it was not. Under individual pay, the availability of
Internet had no significant effect on subjects’ production.
In the treatments in which Internet was available, subjects produced on average 41.7%
more under individual pay than under team pay (Clustered t-test and rank-sum tests: p = .001 and
p = .005, respectively). Similarly, in the absence of Internet subjects produced 25.9% more under
individual pay than under team pay (Clustered t-test and rank-sum tests: p = .012 and p = .014 ,
respectively). These findings are summarized below.14
RESULT 2. (Incentive effects)
Regardless of Internet availability, subjects produced significantly more under individual
pay than under team pay.
13

We find similar results using a panel regression of individual production with robust standard deviations for
session clusters and controlling for a period trend, in which internet coefficients are negative and significant for both
treatments (p’s < 0.001).
14
We confirm these findings in a difference-in-difference regression of total production with robust standard
deviations for session clusters. We find that the coefficient for the Team Pay dummy is negative and significant (p =
0.002). However the Internet dummy and the interaction dummy, although negative, are not significant (p = 0.152
and p = 0.489).

12

In addition to engaging in the work task and Internet browsing, subjects could obtain
earnings from the low-effort clicking task. No significant differences in the clicking task
earnings were observed across treatments (see Table B1 in Appendix B).
Production dynamics
We measured time allocations to Internet browsing and work effort over the five periods of
our experiment to study the dynamics of production. The evolution of production is particularly
relevant in our setting given that fatigue and boredom are likely to arise when completing the
real-effort task repeatedly. Consistently, Internet usage surged from period three onwards (see
Corgnet et al. 2011 for further analyses). Under individual (team) pay, subjects allocated 5.6%
(19.1%) of their time to Internet browsing during the first two periods compared with 16.4%
(34.8%) during the last three periods. The increase in shirking (Internet use) over time under
team pay is consistent with findings in public good games, in which contributions are found to
decrease over time (see Ledyard (1995) for a survey).15 We observed a positive trend in
production for each of the four treatments (see Table B2 in Appendix B), consistent with
learning effects in repeated mental calculation tasks noted in the literature (e.g. see Charness and
Campbell, 1988). The dynamics of production differ, however, across treatments as is illustrated
in Figure 3 below.
Figure 3. — PERIOD EVOLUTION OF AVERAGE PRODUCTION FOR TREATMENTS
WITH AND WITHOUT INTERNET ACCESS.
The case of individual (team) pay is shown on the left (right) panel.

15

In Corgnet et al. (2011), we show (see Table A.2, p5), similarly to the findings in public good games, that an
increase in group production in a given period decreased the production of high performers (above the average
group production) while increasing the production of low performers (below the average group production) in the
next period.

13

Under individual pay, the treatment in which Internet was available and the treatment in
which it was not led to similar production levels in the first two periods. However, from period
three onwards subjects produced relatively more in the treatment in which Internet was not
available. A similar pattern of production was observed under team pay incentives (see right
panel in Figure 3). These observations suggest that the effect of Internet availability is
particularly pronounced after period 2, when Internet usage becomes more prevalent (see Figure
4 below).
Figure 4. — DYNAMICS OF INTERNET EFFECTS ACROSS INCENTIVE SCHEMES.
The case of individual (team) pay is shown on the left (right) panel.
45%
40%

Internet effects

Internet effects

Internet use

Internet use

35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
-5%

Period 1

Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5

Period 2

Period 3

Period 4

Period 5

Team pay

Individual pay

Internet effects are the difference in average production between Internet and No Internet treatments.
Internet use is the percentage of time subjects spent browsing the Internet.

Consequently, we proceed by comparing the Internet and No Internet treatments in the first
two periods of the experiment and in the last three periods separately, for each incentive scheme
(see Table 3).
TABLE 3. — PRODUCTION DYNAMICS.
Panel regressions with random effects and robust standard deviations for session clusters.

Intercept
Period
Trend
Dummy
Internet
Dummy
Team Pay

INDIVIDUAL PAY
TREATMENTS
Periods
Periods
1&2
3 to 5

TEAM PAY
TREATMENTS
Periods
Periods
1&2
3 to 5

NO INTERNET
TREATMENTS
Periods
Periods
1&2
3 to 5

INTERNET
TREATMENTS
Periods
Periods
1&2
3 to 5

2.89***

4.92***

2.73***

3.34***

3.09***

5.18***

3.09***

3.60***

.68***

.17

.45**

.23***

.54***

.10

.59***

.28***

.06

-.85**

-.49***

-.97***

─

─

─

─

─

─

─

─

-.50

-1.36***

-1.05***

-1.47***

*p -value<.10, ** p-value<.05, and *** p-value<.01.
Dummy Internet takes value 1 if the treatment allows for internet browsing, and value 0 otherwise.
Dummy Team Pay takes value 1 if subjects were rewarded with team pay, and value 0 if they were rewarded with individual pay.

14

Under individual pay, the negative effect of Internet browsing was significant in the second
part of the experiment while it was not in the first part of the experiment (see Dummy Internet in
Table 3). This finding suggests that the effect of introducing a real-leisure alternative to the work
task is likely to be more pronounced when the work task is sufficiently long. In our model,
Internet browsing does not impact production whenever the cost of effort is low enough (
) since then subjects exert maximal effort regardless of Internet availability. However, as
fatigue emerges in the second part of the experiment, the cost of effort is likely to rise which may
imply that

. In that case, our model predicts that Internet browsing will affect

production negatively in line with our empirical findings. In the case of team pay and unlike the
case of individual pay, the negative effect of Internet availability was observed across all periods
of the experiment. The fact that internet effects were observed in the first part of the experiment
under team pay while they failed to be observed under individual pay is consistent with our
model as long as

and

. We summarize our findings in Result 3.

RESULT 3. (Internet effects are dynamic)
i)

Under team pay, in all periods, subjects produced significantly less in the treatment in

which Internet was available than in the treatment in which it was not.
ii)

Under individual pay, during the first two periods, subjects produced similarly in the

treatment in which Internet was available and in the treatment in which it was not. During the
last three periods, subjects produced significantly less in the treatment in which Internet was
available than in the treatment in which it was not.
Regarding incentive effects, significant differences in production levels between individual
and team pay were only observed in the second part of the experiment in the case in which
Internet was not available (see Dummy Team Pay for no Internet Treatments in Table 3). In the
case in which Internet was available, however, production was significantly higher under
individual pay than under team pay across all periods of the experiment (see Dummy Team Pay
for Internet Treatments in Table 3). As a result, in the presence of a real-leisure alternative to the
work task, incentive effects are more likely to be detected in shorter and less effortful
experiments where they might not be otherwise. We summarize this in Result 4.

15

RESULT 4. (Incentive effects are dynamic)
i)

In the first two periods, subjects produced similarly under team pay and individual pay in

the case in which Internet was not available. Subjects produced significantly more under
individual pay than under team pay, however, in the case in which Internet was available.
ii)

In the last three periods, subjects produced significantly more under individual pay than

under team pay regardless of Internet availability.
5. CONCLUSIONS
Studying incentives in the laboratory is a fundamental yet challenging endeavor. We
contribute to the experimental labor economics literature by assessing how a real-leisure
alternative (Internet browsing) interacts with manipulated incentives. We incorporated on-the-job
leisure in the experimental protocol by either allowing or restricting Internet access in an
experimental workplace. We showed that subjects dedicated time to this leisure activity when
available, suggesting that part of the performance observed in labor experiments without realleisure can be explained by the lack of alternative desirable activities. Importantly, we identified
that the availability of Internet browsing did not have the same impact under different payment
schemes. Under the weaker incentive scheme (team pay), Internet browsing was more prevalent
than under the stronger incentive scheme (individual pay). As a result, incentive effects which
were measured as the difference in production levels between the individual and the team pay
treatments were more pervasive when Internet browsing was available. Our findings suggest that
researchers conducting laboratory experiments without real-leisure alternatives may be operating
under the hazard of unattenuated active participation, a condition that does not accurately model
incentive tradeoffs between effortful tasks and leisure tasks and which might underestimate
effects of incentive manipulation that really matter in the workplace.
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APPENDIX A
We solve the model by maximizing the utility function of worker
respect to work effort

with

for each of the four treatments:

s.t.

[1]

Deriving first order conditions of [1], we obtain the equilibrium work effort for each
treatment.
Internet effects:


Under individual pay:
If

(

and

), then the increase in production in the no Internet

treatment compared with the Internet treatment is equal to
and decreasing in

(increasing in both

(

and ). If

) which is increasing in

, we will observe no differences

across treatments.


Under team pay:
If

(

and

), then the increase in production in the no

Internet treatment compared with the Internet treatment is equal to
increasing in

and decreasing in

(increasing in both

and

). If

(

) which is
, we will

observe no differences across treatments.
Incentive effects:


In the presence of Internet:
If

(

and

), then the increase in production under

individual pay compared with team is equal to
(increasing) in both

and . If

(

) which is decreasing

, we will observe no differences across treatments.
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In the absence of Internet:
If

(

and

), then the increase in production under individual pay

compared with team is equal to

(

) which is decreasing (increasing) in . If

,

we will observe no differences across treatments.
APPENDIX B
Table B1. — CLICKING TASK.
INDIVIDUAL
PAY &
NO INTERNET

INDIVIDUAL PAY
&
INTERNET

TEAM PAY
&
NO INTERNET

TEAM PAY
&
INTERNET

97.8%

98.2%

98.7%

97.0%

INDIVIDUAL PAY &
INTERNET

.75

-

-

-

TEAM PAY &
NO INTERNET

.45

.66

-

-

TEAM PAY &
INTERNET

.58

.39

.20

-

Success rate
Proportion tests (p-values)

Success rate: Average proportion of the 240 yellow boxes subjects had clicked before they disappeared from the screen.

Table B2. — INDIVIDUAL PRODUCTION.
Panel regressions coefficients with random effects and robust standard deviations
for session clusters.
INDIVIDUAL PAY
&
NO INTERNET
Intercept
Period trend

INDIVIDUAL PAY
&
INTERNET

TEAM PAY
&
NO INTERNET

TEAM PAY
&
INTERNET

3.33***

3.42***

2.95***

2.62***

.53***

.34***

.32***

.17**

*p -value<.10, ** p-value<.05, and *** p-value<.01.
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APPENDIX C
INSTRUCTIONS (TEAM PAY & INTERNET)
Instructions for all treatments are available at:
https://sites.google.com/site/realleisureincentives/home/instructions
Note: In the no Internet treatments ( INDIVIDUAL PAY & NO INTERNET, TEAM PAY & NO
INTERNET), five slides regarding Internet browsing were removed.

APPENDIX D
We show that using the Internet was disruptive. For example, those subjects who switched
back and forth between the Internet and the task were more likely to complete a table incorrectly.
In Table D1, we show the results of a Probit regression where the dependent variable is a dummy
that takes value one if the table was correctly solved, and zero otherwise. We first observe that
the probability of correctly completing a table is lower when subjects have already completed
more tables (Table number). We also control for the time that subjects spent to complete a table,
discounted by the time they were on the Internet (Effective time), and observe that those who
took more time to complete a table were more likely to make mistakes. In Regression 1 we also
control for a dummy (Switching) that takes value 1 if the subject switched (at least once) to the
Internet screen before completing the table. In Regression 2 we control for the time that subjects
spent on the Internet (Time on Internet). In Regression 3 we control for both variables. We find
that browsing the Internet as well as switching back and forth between the Internet and the task
screens decreased the probability of completing a table correctly.
TABLE D1 — INTERNET BROWSING AND PRODUCTION ACCURACY
Probit regression of the probability of correctly completing a table with random effects and
robust standard deviations for session clusters.
Regression 1
Regression 2
Regression 3
Intercept
.873***
.854***
.879***
Period trend
.070***
.072***
.070***
Table number
-.023***
-.024***
-.024***
Effective time
-.106***
-.103***
-.107***
Switching
-.418***
-.297**
Time on Internet
-.095***
-.042--Team Pay
.003***
-.003--.003--Number of observations
3601
3601
3601
Wald test
49.73
58.54
59.48
Prob > χ²
<.001
<.001
<.001
*p-value<.10, **p-value<.05, and ***p-value<.01
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Finally, we did not find significant differences across treatments as the treatment dummy
(Team Pay) was never significant (p’s > .964) when included in any of the three regressions
reported in Table D1. We also conducted similar regressions controlling for interaction effects
between the treatment dummy and the variables “Switching” or “Time on Internet”, but the
coefficients were never significant (p’s > .270).

23

